## Yemen CP

### 2NC CP And K

#### Interpretation—2 conditional advocacies in two frameworks—allows a test of proposal and justification

#### Teaches nuanced advocacy—ideologically diverse arguments force the aff to defend the political middle-ground. Defeating the right and left simultaneously requires nuanced offense, not political extremism, which is the most transferable decisionmaking skill because most decisions aren’t yes/no but finding the best balance.

#### Fosters argument innovation—debaters are risk averse and conditionality is key to different options. Improves 2AC efficiency and strategy which solves their offense. 1 conditional option means teams rely on generics which causes stale debates.

#### Err neg—the aff gets infinite prep and a reactive 2AR—theory itself has a 1 to 6 speech time trade-off.

#### No skews—they’re inevitable because DAs, speed, procedurals—2NR and 2AR solve depth.

#### No contradictions—they help the aff and our 1NC was consistent as an even-if statement

#### Not a voting issue—causes substantive crowdout—the point of being neg is to make it hard for the aff

## CP

### 2NC Overview

#### CP solves the case – ends the CT mission – repurposes to MEDCAPS which deliver medical assistance necessary to combat AIDS in Africa.

### 2NC Overview

#### CP solves the entire case – ends CT mission, repurposes to MEDCAPs which provide medical assistance to combat AIDS in Africa.

#### CP endorses alternative social sciences so that solves and informs implementation

### Troops = Multiple Missions

#### Troops have MULTIPLE MISSIONS – CP ends one, the AFF withdraws.

Note: CJTF-HOA = Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa

Pham 8 – J. Peter Pham, director of the Nelson Institute for International and Public Aff airs at James Madison University, senior fellow at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies, 2008 (“America’s New Africa Command: Paradigm Shift or Step Backwards?” *Brown Journal of World Affairs*, Volume 15, Issue 1, Fall/Winter 2008, PDF, <http://www.jmu.edu/nelsoninstitute/America's%20New%20Africa%20Command%20(Pham-BJWA%202008).pdf>)

In addition to training with partner militaries in the region, CJTF-HOA personnel have been involved in the building or rehabilitation of schools, clinics, and hospitals; conducted medical civic action programs (MEDCAPs), dental civic action programs (DENCAPs), and veterinary civic action programs (VETCAPs); drilled and refurbished wells for communities; and assisted in nearly a dozen major humanitarian assistance missions. Funding for humanitarian assistance programs comes under the aegis of Overseas Humanitarian Disaster and Civic Aid (OHDACA), generally local contracts, and Humanitarian Civic Assistance (HCA), carried out by U.S. and coalition personnel, with the balance favoring the former. As of early 2008, some fifty humanitarian projects were being implemented by CJTF-HOA.

In their personal capacity, some CJTF-HOA personnel based in Djibouti have also initiated a number of innovative, individual-level engagement programs, including English discussion groups, whereby off -duty personnel volunteer to help lead conversations at local English-language schools to facilitate practice for the students, many of whom go on to responsible positions in both the public and private sectors of the country. Some of the chaplains at CJTF-HOA have also begun to engage religious leaders, both Muslim and Christian, in the AOR, a singularly important initiative given that no other agency of the U.S. government, especially in theater, is equipped to handle relations with this sector which is highly infl uential in most societies, and especially so in Africa.45

### 2NC AT Perm Do CP

#### The military conducts CT missions – troops conducting CT missions also conduct other missions, like MEDCAPs. CT is just one mission

#### Perm do the counterplan is severance- their argument is actually awful- they have to reduce the military’s presence in the region, which includes both its geographic location and its mission. They assume that it is only the mission, which is self-serving and leads to terrible mission shift affs that don’t change any of the assets deployed into a geographic area.

#### They don’t have to defend any possible military presence, they have to defend potential alternative uses of the presence they withdraw in the area they withdraw it from- that’s based in the literature

#### And, it’s a legitimate PIC- the military performs multiple missions at once in Africa now- withdrawing the troops ends all missions they are conducting in the area. The counterplan is a PIC out of ending all of the missions, and only ends combat-related missions.

#### And, MEDCAP does exist now in the region, which makes it a predictable use of the soldiers in the area- their argument only makes sense against a counterplan that assigns troops to a completely new mission

#### And, it’s not hypotesting, you just chose to read the resolution as your plan- your bad. This is the only way to force the aff to be responsible for their choice to read the rez in their plan.

#### Plus, hypotesting is good- it’s crucial to ensure balanced division of arguments and ensure debatability- parametricizing devolves into stupid minutia like removing one troop

#### Linear Health Care DA

### 2NC AT Perm Do Plan and Deploy

#### That’s intrinsic- we didn’t deploy new troops- functional and textual intrinsicness are both bad, they eliminate intrinsic DA’s like “the aff eliminates the secondary mission of the troops they remove, that’s bad”.

#### And, obviously we have to win that military forces are needed, they’re just saying we need to have a net benefit to the counterplan- we already read cards that the military is key to access areas that can’t otherwise be accessed, plus they’re the only ones with sufficient maps and intel to make civilian operations effective

#### This is also an inane standard for counterplans- we shouldn’t be responsible for proving that the troops the aff removes are the only way to solve disease, they have the burden to prove they should be removed

### AT: Military Humanitarianism Bad

#### No evidence about medical assistance

#### Military humanitarianism is effective, especially in non-conflict settings

Chretien 11 – Jean-Paul Chretien, Director of Force Health Protection and Afghan National Security Forces Health Development for NATO International Security Assistance Force (Regional Command, South West) in Helmand Province, Afghanistan, 2011 (“US Military Global Health Engagement since 9/11: Seeking Stability through Health,” *Global Health Governance*, Volume 4, Issue 2, Spring 2001, PDF, <http://blogs.shu.edu/wp-content/blogs.dir/109/files/2011/11/Jean-Paul-Chretien_US-Military-Global-Health-Engagement-since-9-11_Spring-2011.pdf>)

It is important to distinguish between peaceful and conflict settings in assessing medical stability operations against these principles. Humanitarian assistance providers generally have praised the US military’s response to natural disasters in areas not beset by conflict, noting that no other organization can deliver large-scale logistical capabilities and relief assets so rapidly. In these settings, most humanitarian actors usually would see the “last resort” standard for military engagement met, along with the core principles of humanity, neutrality, and impartiality. Humanitarian organizations have commented less (at least publicly) on medical stability operations in peaceful areas not experiencing an emergency. They have vigorously addressed military-led assistance in conflict settings.

### AT: Civilian Agencies Do It

#### Military infrastructure key – they integrate military assets with health care providers

Miles and Malone 13 – Shana Miles, Medical Doctor @ Walter Reed National Military Medical Center, Bethesda, Joseph L. Malone, Medical Officer, CDC Resident Advisor and Advisor to President's Malaria Initiative, 2013 (“Perspectives From Ethiopia Regarding U.S. Military Humanitarian Assistance: How to Build a Better Medical Civil Action Project (MEDCAP)” *Military Medicine*, Volume 178, December 2013, PDF available through *EBSCO*)

There are certainly some unique challenges and complexities in working in Ethiopia on global health projects, but many of the issues raised about MEDCAPs in this article may also be applicable to similar projects in other countries. Our goal in sharing these experiences is to emphasize and illustrate the value of the involvement of health care providers during the initial planning phase of MEDCAPs and highlight the importance of communication with other USG organizations and NGOs. To provide the greatest impact, the skills of U.S. military medical assets should be integrated from the early planning stages of MEDCAP assessment and planning. The military medical assets should also receive training or exposure to the local culture and health care system to increase effectiveness.

The varied background and practice of our military medical personnel lends itself to participation in these humanitarian activities. Assessments of the local medical capabilities that are required during the MEDCAP nomination process can be and might be expected to be, shared with other partners (i.e., CDC, USAID). Realizing the capabilities and standards of public hospitals and other health care delivery sites in the host nation can provide for a more accurate assessment of the needs and potential sustainable projects at the site. The proper selection and execution of sustainable MEDCAPs can be a powerful tool in garnering the confidence and trust of these host nation populations. Military medical professionals and others conducting MEDCAP assessments and submitting proposals can likely increase the speed of MEDCAP project approval and implementation by following some of these suggestions and by avoiding some of the recent issues that delayed or prevented project implementation of several recently nominated MEDCAP projects.

### 2NC AT AFRICOM=Propaganda

#### They have to have specific evidence that our counterplan is propaganda to win this argument- MEDCAPs is a medical assistance program that is not designed as a hearts and minds operation- it’s a medical military mission that leverages medical expertise, not a phase zero operation

#### The military has medical expertise – MEDCAPs offer critical medical care and supplies

Walther 9 – Andrea Walther, MALD candidate at The Fletcher School where she is concentrating in International Security Studies, worked for Mayor Cory Booker and the City of Newark, New Jersey’s Office of Homeland Security, the Council on Foreign Relations, and the United Nations Security Council, 2009 (“Notes on U.S. Africa Command Operations in Mali,” *PRAXIS: The Fletcher Journal of Human Security*, Volume 24, 2009, <http://fletcher.tufts.edu/~/media/Fletcher/Microsites/praxis/xxiv/PRAXISXXIV_7Walther.pdf>)

When I asked the U.S. Air Force officers how they felt taking part in these recent humanitarian mission assignments, they proudly informed me that MEDCAP missions are not a new concept for the military, nor are they unique to the U.S. Armed Forces. Members of the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) have already incorporated MEDCAP missions into peacemaking and peacekeeping operations around the world, including in Afghanistan, the Balkans, and Iraq. During the past ten years, the U.S. has organized MEDCAPs in Croatia, Haiti, Somalia, Bosnia, Albania, and Yugoslavia. The creation of U.S. AFRICOM has increased the number and frequency of MEDCAPs conducted in Africa.

Though the doctors at the MEDCAP worked through a constantly growing line of patients for nearly nine hours straight, the local women expressed frustration that only eight of the surrounding towns were being assisted. This MEDCAP had been conducted in an ad hoc manner as the medical supplies utilized for the day’s treatments had been extra supplies, left over from a larger MEDCAP held a few months earlier. I felt that the Air Force medics were going above and beyond their duty by adding an extra MEDCAP to the exercise, but I questioned whether it was a positive thing that these additional resources went to a clinic that served mostly military families. What message was this giving to the rest of the population—that military families deserve priority and preferential treatment? Unfortunately the outreach regarding this MEDCAP was not as thoroughly conducted as those planned months ahead.

As the MEDCAP drew to a close, the Air Force medics had seen over four-hundred townspeople and donated $275,000 worth of medical supplies for the local clinic to use during the next few months. While one clear benefit of MEDCAPs is that they provide medical care and supplies to local populations who would not otherwise receive them, the exercise’s fundamental objective is to provide training opportunities for U.S. military medics and staff. MEDCAPs also offer the opportunity for U.S. military medics to gain a better understanding of an individual country’s medical assets and capabilities, or lack thereof. Finally, these exercises represent an effort to instill confidence in local citizens with respect to the U.S. Armed Forces, and to strengthen relations between the U.S. and its partner nations; the two elements are better known as the “hearts and minds” campaign. By the end of my two-week trip, I left with a deeper understanding of the immense magnitude of both the military and humanitarian sides of the operation.

### 2NC AT AFRICOM Irredeemable

#### Not offense- the aff can’t eliminate AFRICOM- there’s only a risk that focusing on the MEDCAP mission is good

#### State doesn’t solve- must be the military- only way to access some regions

Miles and Malone 13 – Shana Miles, Medical Doctor @ Walter Reed National Military Medical Center, Bethesda, Joseph L. Malone, Medical Officer, CDC Resident Advisor and Advisor to President's Malaria Initiative, 2013 (“Perspectives From Ethiopia Regarding U.S. Military Humanitarian Assistance: How to Build a Better Medical Civil Action Project (MEDCAP)” *Military Medicine*, Volume 178, December 2013, PDF available through *EBSCO*)

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#### Counterplan solves the dual mission problem that messed up AFRICOM missions in the past- we eliminate the counterterror mission that Seybolt says has messed up past operations. Plus their card says fighting AIDS specifically is seen as positive

Seybolt 11—Asst. Prof at the Grad School of Public and International Affairs at U of Pittsburgh, PhD in Political science from MIT, Interim Director of the Ford Institute for Human Security [Taylor, “What AFRICOM Says about US Foreign Policy,” in *African Security and the African Command*, ed. by Terry Buss, 2011, p. 238-241]

African suspicions of US interests as compared to their own interests also are based on past experience. On the positive side of the ledger, the administration of then President George Bush raised the level of attention that the US government pays to Africa. The amount of funding to fight HIV/ AIDS increased dramatically during the Bush presidency, for example. The importance of Africa to the United States, however, clearly was set in the context of the global war on terror (see Chapters 9, IO and 11 on alQaeda in Africa) and the quest for access to the continent's oil reserves (see Chapters 6 and 7 on this issue). While there is some commonality of interest on these topics , of greater importance to most Africans are the ability to put food on their tables, stay healthy, and send their children to school. These human security concerns are not well met by a military organization that is focused on terrorism and oil. In fact, military action against suspected terrorist groups can exacerbate local tensions and reduce the physical security of the population. 2 AFRICOM makes a point of emphasizing its benign role on the continent, but it has been inconsistent in delivering this message, as other contributions to this volume show. That inconsistency does not convince suspicious observers that AFRICOM will benefit Africans . State Department officials have bureaucr atic and substantive concerns about AFRICOM . On the bureaucratic side, many foreign service officers see AFRICOM as a Defense effort to fill organizational gaps in the military command structure and in the foreign policy apparatus. While the new command makes good bureaucratic sense within Defense, State ought to be the one to fill the foreign policy gap. AFRICOM's mission statement and hybrid structure indicate Defense is moving into State 's turf On the substantive side, African countries need help with strengthening their institutions of governance more than they need help with counterinsurgency or other military matters. State is best positioned to provide assistance in these areas, but career diplomats fear that once AF RI COM is established, Congress will not fund State and USAID to do things that the military is.already doing in the field, even if those things are diplomatic in nature. 3

#### Also doesn’t say there is actually a trade-off with state, only that some career politicians are worried it will- they have an incentive to overblow the threat

### 2NC AT “Instrumentalization”- Keenan 10

#### US military presence can create instability and conflict- it doesn’t necessarily- their evidence is about military forces performing a dual role, instead of only performing their humanitarian function.

#### And, most of this is about discursively framing Africa as a terrorist wasteland-

#### a.) The aff doesn’t solve that, military strategy planners, FOX news and most debaters are still going to think that about Africa

#### b.) The counterplan solves better- it’s only a step in the right direction- it reprioritizes medical wellbeing in a way that resolves blowback

Chretien 11 – Jean-Paul Chretien, Director of Force Health Protection and Afghan National Security Forces Health Development for NATO International Security Assistance Force (Regional Command, South West) in Helmand Province, Afghanistan, 2011 (“US Military Global Health Engagement since 9/11: Seeking Stability through Health,” *Global Health Governance*, Volume 4, Issue 2, Spring 2001, PDF, <http://blogs.shu.edu/wp-content/blogs.dir/109/files/2011/11/Jean-Paul-Chretien_US-Military-Global-Health-Engagement-since-9-11_Spring-2011.pdf>)

Africa, home to many fragile states (several of its countries consistently make the top of a global ranking), 8 porous borders, and terrorist groups linked to Al Qaeda, became a focus of the US military’s stability operations after 9/11. The US military established the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) in Djibouti in 2002, which remains its only substantial presence in Africa. CJTF-HOA uses “civil military operations as the cornerstone to countering violent extremism and building partner nation and regional security capacity” in East Africa. 9 Its health-related activities include building and renovating clinics and hospitals, and providing medical care to local populations in medical civil action programs (MEDCAPs). CJTF-HOA became part of US Africa Command (AFRICOM) after it was established in 2007. AFRICOM also provides medical care to indigenous populations through its Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership, in northwestern Africa. 10

#### The only part about physical presence is about our bases, which the plan leaves- the plan removes the forces associated with counterterror

## Case

### AT Solve Militarism

#### Circumvention args don’t take out the terror DA – it proves the AFF doesn’t limit violence, it just instead gets replaced with ineffective attempts for the US to exert control. Plan causes a shift to CIA death squads which only furthers radicalization and doesn’t solve structural violence.

#### They don’t solve militarism – the debate is about the consequences of the plan – anything else gives the AFF too much latitude and results in extra-topical cases that are impossible to negate because they incentivize a proliferation of unpredictable method arguments.

#### Whole thesis of the advantage is the US is addicted to military intervention, assassination, CT operations in Africa – doesn’t solve high-tech militarism because drones are used in other places like Pakistan or Yemen, and it doesn’t solve preemption because the logic of preemption isn’t limited to counterterror and it’s certainly not limited to African counterterror. US hostility toward China, North Korea, Iran, and Russia create the same militaristic scripts that trigger the advantage – rely on the same invocation of danger that justifies permanent warfare.

#### Turse is about US CT operations against Boko Haram in Nigeria which is not in the Greater Horn of Africa. It’s about “military activities” which AFF doenst end.

#### 5 of 6 AFRICOM bases are outside the Horn

Brown, 13 (David E. Brown, career member of the Senior Foreign Service, Senior Diplomatic Advisor at Africa Center for Strategic Studies, previously Senior Advisor to the J-5 Director of AFRICOM, three time Deputy Chief of Mission at U.S. Embassies in Benin, Mauritania, and Burkina Faso, “AFRICOM AT 5 YEARS: THE MATURATION OF A NEW U.S. COMBATANT COMMAND”, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College Press, August 2013, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB1164.pdf, pp. 18-20)

As its name suggests, AFRICOM is responsible for all DoD operations, exercises, and security cooperation in 54 of 55 nations on the African continent, its island nations, and surrounding waters.47 The single exception has been Egypt, which, because of that nation’s strong ties to the rest of the Middle East, has remained part of the Central Command.48 As of the end of fiscal year (FY) 2012, AFRICOM had approximately 2,300 assigned personnel, including U.S. military, civilian, and contractor employees. About 1,500 personnel work at the command’s headquarters at Kelly Barracks in Stuttgart. Others are assigned to AFRICOM units at MacDill Air Force Base near Tampa, Florida, and the Joint Analysis Center in Molesworth, England. AFRICOM’s service component commands and theater Special Operations Command component are:

• U.S. Army Africa: Operating from Vicenza, Italy, it conducts sustained security engagements with African land forces to promote security, stability, and peace. 1,600 personnel.49

• U.S. Naval Forces Africa: Headquartered in Naples, Italy, its primary mission is to improve the maritime security capability and capacity of African partners. Personnel are shared with U.S. Naval Forces Europe. 900 personnel.

• U.S. Air Force Africa: Based at Ramstein Air Force Base, Germany, it conducts sustained security engagement and operations to promote air safety, security, and development in Africa. 954 personnel.

• U.S. Marine Corps Forces Africa: Located in Stuttgart, it conducts operations, exercises, training, and security cooperation activities throughout the African continent. Staff is shared with the U.S. Marine Corps Forces Europe. 319 personnel.

• Special Operations Command Africa: A theater Special Operations Command component, Special Operations Command Africa is co-located at AFRICOM’s headquarters in Stuttgart. 600 personnel.

• Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa: Located at Camp Lemonnier, a Forward Operating Site in Djibouti with approximately 2,000 personnel (400 staff and 1,600 forces).50 Camp Lemonnier can also be considered AFRICOM’s only base on the African continent.51

AFRICOM’s other forward operating site besides Combined Joint Task Force—Horn of Africa is on UK’s Ascension Island in the south Atlantic. It also has Cooperative Security Locations in Algeria, Botswana, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Mali, Namibia, Sao Tome and Principe, Sierra Leone, Tunisia, Uganda, and Zambia. 52

The location of AFRICOM, its service components, and its theater Special Operations Command component are shown in Table 3.

### No Root Cause

#### Monocausal, ideological explanations of international relations fail and obscure the proximate dynamics that causal war and violence.

**Rotter 08** – (2008, Andrew, Professor of History at Colgate University, “The Cultural History of Foreign Relations” in *A Companion to American Cultural History*, pp. 430-3)

Studies on cultural transmission have opened diplomatic history to new subjects and new interpretations, and constructively complicated its assumptions about what constitutes foreign relations. Some culturalists believe, however, that studies of fashion, tourism, and musical theater fail to address real power relations between nations. Fashion and tourism and musicals, they say, may reveal something about one people’s attitudes toward another; but to understand why nations behave as they do, it is essential to bring the state back into the analysis. How, for example, do such cultural analysands as race, gender, and language help us parse hard power, including the mechanics of empire and the conduct of war? Can the Geertzian approach explain not just the context but the content, and even the cause/effect, of US foreign relations?

To be sure, many of the previously cited books do concern power; and the distinction between “cultural transmission” and “culture as power” may be artificial. Let us consider several specifi c ways in which historians have tried directly to connect attitudes, images, values, and prejudices to the practice of foreign policy, and the exercise of state power. Begin with race. For some years, scholars have noted that white racism has influenced US policy toward non-white others. For Michael Hunt, racism is one of three main elements of American ideology (1987). Reginald Horsman (1981) and Richard Slotkin (1985) have shown that white acceptance of racist social science during the nineteenth century enabled brutal treatment of Native Americans, Mexicans, and Filipinos, among others. John Dower’s War Without Mercy (1986), a harrowing account of the Pacifi c War, demonstrates that white Americans and Japanese killed and maimed each other remorselessly because of their mutual racism. During the Cold War, US policy toward Africa was guided in part by the assumption that black Africans were unready for, and perhaps incapable of, self-government. In South Africa (Borstelmann 1993), Zimbabwe (Horne 2001), and all across the African continent (Noer 1985), white Americans sheltered too long and lovingly racist white minority governments that frustrated black aspirations to democracy.

Domestic race relations also played a role in US foreign policy. The rising civil rights movement after 1945 exposed American racism and embarrassed a succession of presidents trying to win the Cold War with the claim that communists represented tyranny, the Americans and their allies freedom. African Americans often identifi ed with black freedom fi ghters in Africa, and vice versa, as both groups struggled against white power structures that denigrated and oppressed them. African Americans spoke out against racism at home and racist colonialism abroad, prompting State Department offi cial (and later secretary of state) Dean Rusk to admit that race discrimination in the United States was “the biggest single burden that we carry” into the arena of diplomacy. A good deal of scholarly attention has been paid recently to the impact of domestic race relations on US policy making (Horne 1986; Plummer 1996; Von Eschen 1997; Krenn 1999; Dudziak 2000; Gallicchio 2000; Borstelmann 2001; Anderson 2003).

Along with race, gender has increasingly become an important analysand for historians of foreign relations. Joan Scott’s infl uential essay “Gender: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis,” fi rst published in 1986, questioned why historians seemed to think that gender was “irrelevant to . . . issues of politics and power”; in her view, “high politics itself is a gendered concept” (Scott 1996: 48). Emily Rosenberg responded to this challenge (1990) and gradually thereafter, foreign relations historians began to apply gender analysis to their studies of diplomacy, imperialism, and war. Some saw gender as a way to consider the role of women in international encounters, as occasional makers of policy (Jeffreys-Jones 1995), as agents of foreign relations through non-governmental organizations (Tyrrell 1991), or as those on the receiving end of imperial power (Enloe 1990; Moon 1997; Findlay 1999; Goedde 2003; Shibusawa 2006). Some studies of gender included consideration of sexuality and/or race.

Other scholarship involving gender has concerned the role played by cultural constructions of the masculine and the feminine in shaping images of selves and others in US foreign policy. The United States has typically seen itself as a masculine nation, honor-bound to protect allegedly feminine others, or to discipline those whose fl ighty and effeminate misbehavior threatens international stability. The quest for manliness has been associated with certain American presidents; as Kristin Hoganson has written, “historians have turned Theodore Roosevelt into a virtual poster boy for the utility of gender in foreign relations history” (Hoganson 1998; Bederman 1995; Dalton 2002). Frank Costigliola has discovered signifi cance in the gendered language of Cold Warrior George Kennan, who repeatedly warned against the “penetration” of the “West” by Soviet expansionism (Costigliola 1997). The fear of appearing soft on communism drove John F. Kennedy to insist on masculine toughness in his policy toward the Soviet Union and Vietnam (Dean 2001). Other historians have claimed that the United States is periodically seized by a “crisis of masculinity” that fi nds an outlet in an aggressive foreign policy, regardless of who is president. Rendering international others as feminine has enabled the United States, and other imperial nations, to naturalize or justify interference in others’ affairs. Paternalism guided US policy toward Latin America and the Caribbean; the North Americans sought to control allegedly fl ighty and emotional Haitians, Cubans, and Puerto Ricans (Renda 2001; Perez 1998; Findlay 1999). The annals of US foreign relations are populated by tremulous Chinese, cowering Hindus, tough Muslims and weeping Muslims, manly Israelis, effete Frenchmen, and so forth. The “tough” and “manly” won praise and support from the United States. The “weak” and “soft” required fi rm, masculine guidance.

If foreign relations historians have confi rmed that gender is “a useful category of historical analysis” even within realms of power, they have nevertheless found that gender alone, like race alone, has explanatory limits. The challenge for historians, as Hoganson puts it, “is shifting from demonstrating the relevance of gender to situating gender alongside strategic, economic, political, and other factors” (1998: 316). Some historians have opened their cultural analysis to a greater number of variables, by looking carefully at the language of foreign policy makers or those groups that influence them. Language, particularly in its metaphors, can convey a host of meanings infl ected by the culture that produces it. Kennan’s language in his famous “Long Telegram” (1946) was gendered – it feminized the Russian people, for whom Kennan had an almost sexual affection, and cast as rapacious the current Soviet leadership – but it also indulged in references to illness, as in the “Kremlin’s neurotic view of world affairs” and Soviet leaders being “affl icted” with insecurity (Costigliola 1997). Geoffrey Smith has associated gender, pathology, and perceptions of national security in his explanation of the Red (fear of communism) and Lavender (fear of gay people) Scares that swept the United States in the late 1940s and early 1950s (Smith 1992). Homosexuality was purportedly a sexual perversion, a disease, and a risk to national security because gays were readily blackmailed by their communist handlers.

Increasingly, historians of foreign relations are trying to do justice to the complexity of culture and the disparate ways it affects perception and decision making. It is never neat work. Who is to say, for example, whether race or religion more insistently conditioned US policy toward Muslim Pakistan and Hindu India during the 1950s? How did interwoven ideas concerning gender, race, and class shape North American initiatives in Puerto Rico or Cuba at the beginning of the twentieth century? A number of scholars have skillfully blended the discrete elements of culture to offer satisfying explanations of American encounters with others (Stephanson 1995; Dower 1999; Bradley 2000; Connelly 2002; Klein 2003).

The most direct result of the poststructural challenge to the history of US foreign relations has been the emergence of postcolonial or subaltern studies, a movement closely associated with the late Edward Said, whose Orientalism (1978) was its foundation text. Postcolonial scholars admired Marx and especially the Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci, but revealed their poststructural affi liations through their interest in literature, subjectivity, prisons, schools, and discourse, and through their footnotes, which cited more Foucault than Marx. The postcolonialists were emphatically interested in empire and power. While they were clear in their condemnation of colonialism, they looked imaginatively at the relationships empire created between the dominant nation, its agents, and colonized “subalterns” (Subaltern Studies, 1988– 2000). Perhaps the most important contribution of the subaltern scholars was their ascription of agency to the weaker parties in the colonial relationship – men and women who, in spite of having limited power, shaped their own identities and forged resistance despite their subordinate status. Gender and often race figured prominently in these works.

Said and the Subaltern Studies quickly found their way into the arguments (and the footnotes) of foreign relations culturalists. Essays in Cultures of United States Imperialism (Kaplan & Pease 1993) used poststructural theory to expand the horizons of historians more comfortable sorting through diplomatic correspondence than contemplating the prosthetics of empire, stuffed gorillas at New York’s Museum of Natural History, and Tokyo Disneyland – all subjects of essays in the Kaplan–Pease anthology. As Rosenberg has noted, much of the foreign relations history inspired by poststructuralism has focused on the formal American empire: on the Philippines, and especially on Latin America (Joseph et al. 1998; Rosenberg 1999; Rafael 2000; Renda 2001). Adopting postmodern theory, regarding empire as an engagement of cultures, and exploring mutual images and attitudes as displayed in the media, in fi ction, and in travel literature, these scholars have nevertheless combed the archives in search of affi liations between the offi cial language of diplomacy and the broader discourse of encounter.

It would be satisfying to report that culturalism has swept the field, and achieved the stature of realist, revisionist, or even post-revisionist accounts of US foreign relations. There is no question that culturalism has gained a measure of respect, certainly among younger entrants to the fi eld, and with some older scholars as well. Yet resistance remains. Some seems churlish: that cultural infl uence is harder to measure than, say, trade fl ows during the 1930s is self-evident, and hardly disqualifi es culture as a meaningful category of analysis. But there is thoughtful criticism as well. Culture is an elastic concept; if it includes and explains everything, it threatens to explain nothing in particular. Culture, moreover, can occlude the operations of cause and effect. Exploring how selves see themselves and others does not necessarily illuminate *why* selves or others *act* as they do [italics in original]. And cultural perceptions are likely to depend on interests: Americans during the Pacific War hated and dehumanized the Japanese, but cherished the Chinese as honest, virtuous, and quaint. Above all, critics have charged, culture in the end has not much to do with power. Oppression is not, they say, about ridicule, stereotype, or ideas based on gender, race, or religion. Language does not kill people; war is not a discourse. In its affection for Geertzian context, its emphasis on image, culturalism neglects what is most important about US foreign relations.

### AT Solve Yemen

#### Incirlik, Qatar, Kuwait, Carriers in Persian Gulf

### CIA Shift

#### Mazzetti 14 – AFF doesn’t even mandate closing the base, normal means given all of their theoretical evidence describing the drivers of conflict proves we would just make it a secret CIA black site.

#### Circumvention doesn’t take out the case – we need drones to fight Al Shabaab

#### CIA kill teams and trainers teams fill in post plan – plan is exactly how Obama wants to sustain US Empire

Turse 12

(Nick, The Changing Face of Empire: SPECIAL OPS, DRONES, SPIES, PROXY FIGHTERS, SECRET BASES, AND CYBERWARFARE, pg. 2-4)

For many years, the U.S. military has been talking up and promoting the concept of "jointness" An Army helicopter landing Navy SEALs on a Korean ship catches some of this ethos at the tactical level. But the future, it seems, has something else in store. Think of it as «blur-ness," a kind of organizational version of war-fighting in which a dominant Pentagon fuses its forces with other government agencies - especially **the CIA, the State Department, and the Drug Enforcement Administration** - in complex overlapping missions around the globe.

In 2001, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld began his "revolution in military affairs;' steering the Pentagon toward a military-lite model of high-tech, agile forces. The concept came to a grim end in Iraq's embattled cities. A decade later, the last vestiges of its many failures continue to play out in a stalemated war in Afghanistan against a rag-tag minority insurgency that can't be beaten. In the years since, two secretaries of defense and a new president have presided over another transformation - this one geared toward avoiding ruinous, large-scale land wars which the U.S. has consistently proven unable to win.

Under President Obama, the U.S. has expanded or launched numerous military campaigns - most of them utilizing a mix of the six elements of twenty-first-century American war. Take the American war in Pakistan - a poster-child for what might now be called the Obama formula, if not doctrine. Beginning as a highly- circumscribed drone assassination campaign backed by limited cross-border commando raids under the Bush administration, U.S. operations in Pakistan **have expanded** into something close to a full-scale robotic air war, complemented by cross-border helicopter at- tacks, **CIA-funded "kill teams**" of Afghan proxy forces, as well as boots-on-the-ground missions by elite special operations forces, including the SEAL raid that killed Osama bin Laden.

The CIA has conducted clandestine intelligence and surveillance missions in Pakistan, too. though its role may, in the future, be less important, thanks to Pentagon mission creep. In April 2012, in fact, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta announced the creation of a new Clx-Hke espionage agency within the Pentagon called the Defense Clandestine Service. According to the Washington Post, its aim is to expand "the military's espionage effort beyond war zones:'

Over the last decade, the very notion of war zones has become remarkably muddled, mirroring the blurring of the missions and activities of the CIA and Pentagon. Analyzing the new agency and the «broader convergence trend" between Department of Defense and CIA missions, the Post noted that the "blurring is also evident in the organizations' upper ranks. Panetta previously served as CIA director, and that post is currently held by retired four-star Army Gen. David H. Petraeus"

Not to be outdone, the State Department, once the seat of diplomacy, continued on its long march to militarization (and marginalization) when it agreed to pool some of its resources with the Pentagon to create the Global Security Contingency Fund. That program will allow the Defense Department even greater say in how aid from Washington will flow to proxy forces in places like Yemen and the Horn of Africa.

One thing is certain: American war-making (along with its spies and its diplomats) is heading ever deeper into "the shadows:' Expect yet more clandestine operations in ever more places with, of course, **ever more potential for blowback** in the years ahead

### France Shift

#### France maintains military presence after the plan

Styan 13 – David Styan, Lecturer in Politics, Birbeck, University of London, PhD from London School of Economics (department of international relations), 2013 (“Djibouti: Changing Influence in the Horn’s Strategic Hub,” *Chatham House*, April 2013, Briefing Paper, PDF, <http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/public/Research/Africa/0413bp_djibouti.pdf> | ADM)

Despite its growing military presence, it is facile to view the United States as simply displacing French power in Djibouti. Even with the further reduction in its military presence in 2011, France still has more frontline troops, aircraft and firepower permanently based there than the United States does. France is still legally the external guarantor of Djibouti’s security, including its air and maritime space.25 As such, it is involved in extensive intelligence and logistical cooperation with the United States, as well as with the growing array of multilateral forces operating in the country. Its role is enhanced by its de facto status as the logistical anchor for EUNAVFOR’s vessels and personnel.

France has a closer historical relationship than the United States with Djibouti’s ruling elite and paramilitary forces. Although relations have changed, France’s military engagement remains extremely significant. In the 1980s its military direct and indirect expenditure, as well as private capital and services, accounted for the lion’s share of the formal sector of Djibouti’s economy. This is no longer the case, although France continues to invest in the education sector, notably secondary education via its lycées. It significantly cut the number and changed the composition of its troops in Djibouti at the end of the 1990s, down to 2,600. More significantly for Djibouti’s economy, family postings were slashed and troops rotated far more frequently, and local spending fell considerably.

Djibouti remains host to France’s largest military base in Africa. Nevertheless, changes in the French military presence are largely the consequence of changing priorities in Paris. The 2008 Defence White Paper prompted a series of strategic and cost-cutting measures, including a significant reconfiguration of forces in Africa and the closure of bases in West Africa. Defence agreements with all former French colonies in Africa were renegotiated and Djibouti’s role in the global projection of French power was reconfigured

#### That means the plan doesn’t meaningful alter American presence either

Styan 13 – David Styan, Lecturer in Politics, Birbeck, University of London, PhD from London School of Economics (department of international relations), 2013 (“Djibouti: Changing Influence in the Horn’s Strategic Hub,” *Chatham House*, April 2013, Briefing Paper, PDF, <http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/public/Research/Africa/0413bp_djibouti.pdf> | ADM)

France is also now engaged in greater cooperation with US and other forces, partly reflecting its full reintegration into NATO’s command structure since 2009 and its participation in multilateral forces, including in Afghanistan. In July 2012 a five-year agreement was signed between France and the United States to enhance aerial logistical cooperation between their forces in Djibouti. Both forces regularly report publicly on joint missions in and beyond the country.30

### Proxy Shift

#### The plan is net worse for preventing colonial violence in East Africa – reduction of “boots on the ground” causes a push for military aid and arms sales to proxy forces like AMISOM – that’s Bruton. Proxy-driven conflict is unstable and driven by neocolonialism – guarantees escalating violence and exacerbates the negative impacts of American presence – that’s Rozoff.

#### First, the plan causes a shift to proxy nations – it deputizes African regimes to achieve strategic goals in Africa

**Anderson and Fisher 15** (David M. Anderson, Professor of African History at the University of Warwick. And Jonathan Fisher, Lecturer in the International Development Department at the University of Birmingham. “Authoritarianism and the securitization of development in Africa,” in International Affairs 91: 1 (2015) 131–151 © 2015 The Author(s). International Affairs © 2015 The Royal Institute of International Affairs. Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford ox4 2dq, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA.

**Following the disastrous failure of US Operation Restore Hope in Somalia in 1993 and the recriminations in western capitals in the aftermath of Rwanda’s genocide the following year**, **donors rapidly stepped back** from direct involvement in African peacekeeping efforts. **This** key moment of change in donor relations with the continent **has been** skilfully **brokered** by the Ugandan, Ethiopian and Rwandan regimes **through** their **championing of the ‘African solutions to African problems’ agenda.** Bolstered by pan-Africanist and nationalist rhetoric in equal measure, **this** enterprise **has seen** the three **regimes** **continuously volunteering and committing troops to peacekeeping missions in regional trouble spots where donors have a key geostrategic interest but are reluctant to deploy soldiers themselves**. **Thus Uganda has contributed troops to peacekeeping in Liberia, volunteered troops for missions in Sudan and**, since 2007, been the largest contributor to AMISOM.57 **Ethiopia has done the same in Burundi, and has maintained a continuous intervention in Somalia—most of the time with tacit US approval—against Islamist ‘extremists**’ since the late 1990s (and as part of AMISOM since 2014). Likewise, **Rwandan troops have played a leading role in both African Union and United Nations missions** in Darfur since 2004, **earning** considerable **praise from senior US military officials**.58 Déby in Chad was slower to grasp the opportunities of peacekeeping, but since the fall of the Gaddafi regime in Libya the Chadian army has responded to the security threat in West Africa, participating with French forces in the Malian intervention in 2012 and most recently ( July 2014) providing the key elements, and a training and deployment base, for the French-sponsored anti-Islamist regional security initiative.59 The Meles and Museveni **regimes also played a crucial role in ferrying military and logistical support from Washington to the south Sudanese People’s Liberation Army** (SPLA) during the 1990s as part of a wider mission to undermine Khartoum, **with one** former senior US **official** **privately acknowledging that these two regimes did a ‘lot of heavy lifting’ for the Clinton and George W. Bush administrations**.60 As well as dispatching troops to Mali, Chad under Déby allowed EU and UN peacekeepers to operate from its territory to address the humanitarian situation in neighbouring Darfur. These activities served important domestic, regional and ideological purposes for these regimes. The impetus for the initiatives sometimes came from the donor side: Déby reportedly needed to be ‘persuaded’ by Paris of the merits of the EU mission in Darfur,61 whereas Museveni and Meles were proactive in persuading donors to support what eventually became AMISOM (and western enthusiasm for ‘African solutions to African problems’ undoubtedly helped to support and reify this initiative from the outset).

#### Proxies are the primary force for colonial intervention – US-backed uprisings are violent and dangerous

Turse 14 – Nick Turse, Ph.D. in Sociomedical Sciences from the Columbia University's Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, 2014 (“﻿America’s Proxy Wars in Africa,” *The Nation*, March 13th, <https://www.thenation.com/article/americas-proxy-wars-africa/> | ADM)

You could be forgiven if this jumble of words looks like nonsense to you. It isn’t. It’s the language of the US military’s simmering African interventions; the patois that goes with a set of missions carried out in countries most Americans couldn’t locate on a map; the argot of conflicts now primarily fought by proxies and a former colonial power on a continent that the US military views as a hotbed of instability and that hawkish pundits increasingly see as a growth area for future armed interventions.

Since 9/11, the US military has been making inroads in Africa, building alliances, facilities and a sophisticated logistics network. Despite repeated assurances by US Africa Command (AFRICOM) that military activities on the continent were minuscule, a 2013 investigation by TomDispatch exposed surprisingly large and expanding US operations—including recent military involvement with no fewer than forty-nine of the fifty-four nations on the continent. Washington’s goal continues to be building these nations into stable partners with robust, capable militaries, as well as creating regional bulwarks favorable to its strategic interests in Africa. Yet over the last years, the results have often confounded the planning—with American operations serving as a catalyst for blowback (to use a term of CIA tradecraft).

A US-backed uprising in Libya, for instance, helped spawn hundreds of militias that have increasingly caused chaos in that country, leading to repeated attacks on Western interests and the killing of the US ambassador and three other Americans. Tunisia has become ever more destabilized, according to a top US commander in the region. Kenya and Algeria were hit by spectacular, large-scale terrorist attacks that left Americans dead or wounded. South Sudan, a fledgling nation Washington recently midwifed into being that has been slipping into civil war, now has more than 870,000 displaced persons, is facing an imminent hunger crisis, and has recently been the site of mass atrocities, including rapes and killings. Meanwhile, the US-backed military of Mali was repeatedly defeated by insurgent forces after managing to overthrow the elected government, and the US-supported forces of the Central African Republic (CAR) failed to stop a ragtag rebel group from ousting the president.

#### AMISOM in particular carries out indiscriminate violence and prevent cooperative relations in the region

Williams 13 – Paul D. Williams, Associate Professor of International Affairs @ GWU Elliot School of International Affairs, (“AMISOM’s Five Challenges,” CSIS, November 14th, http://csis.org/story/amisom%E2%80%99s-five-challenges)

It is difficult to conclude that AMISOM has made a large contribution to peace and security in Mogadishu during its 30 months. While its personnel did engage in some humanitarian activities and protection of key infrastructure, these have to be balanced against the popular outrage against instances of indiscriminate force, the loss of over 20 peacekeepers, and the obvious limitations in a hot-conflict of an underequipped deployment of some 4,000 troops. When a greater degree of stability did return to Mogadishu in early 2009 this was not because of AMISOM but rather a combination of the withdrawal of Ethiopian forces and the wider diplomatic activity that resulted in Sheikh Ahmed’s election and his subsequent ability to engage a wide range of parties and enact shari’a law. Violence has flared again in recent weeks, and neither Somalis nor the world’s governments should look to the AU forces to quell it. Whether AMISOM has a future in Mogadishu is thus primarily a question for the new government, the UN Security Council, and the AU to answer. Whether AMISOM should have been deployed at all is a question analysts should debate.

#### Second, the aff just shuffles around troops and places them under the NATO banner – the plan text just says “eliminate the Combined Joint Task Force,” which ends a program but doesn’t prevent the reassignment of troops to an international effort. NATO is the worst form of military colonialism – it infiltrates African states and prevents independence.

#### Finally, the aff leaves the broader structure of AFRICOM in place – AFRICOM uses the guise of “light presence” and to extend operations throughout Africa. The plan causes a shift to covert AFRICOM operations

Azikiwe 15 – Abayomi Azikiwe, editor of the Pan-African News Wire, citing Nick Turse, Ph.D. in Sociomedical Sciences from the Columbia University's Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, 2015 (“‘Tomorrow’s Battlefield: U.S. Proxy Wars and Secret Ops in Africa’,” *Center for Research on Globalization*, May 5th, <http://www.globalresearch.ca/tomorrows-battlefield-u-s-proxy-wars-and-secret-ops-in-africa/5447468>)

Since the launching of AFRICOM, instability has increased in Africa. From the ongoing war in Somalia, to the break-up of the Republic of Sudan and the subsequent civil war in the newly-created Republic of South Sudan, to the war against so-called Islamic extremists in Nigeria, Niger, Mali, Cameroon and Chad, these developments has fueled Washington’s militarism on the continent.

The defense budget allocations for AFRICOM have increased substantially since the advent of the Obama administration. In many respects this U.S. war in Africa has remained hidden from both domestic and international news coverage often being depicted as targeted Special Forces commando and drone strikes against individual operatives of designated terrorist organizations.

The Hidden U.S. Imperialist War in Africa

Turse writes of this expanding imperialist militarism saying “For years, the U.S. military has publicly insisted that its efforts in Africa are negligible, intentionally leaving the American people, not to mention most Africans, in the dark about the true size, scale, and scope of its operations there. AFRICOM public affairs personnel and commanders have repeatedly claimed no more than a ‘light footprint’ on the continent.”

He goes to note how:

“They (Pentagon) shrink from talk of camps and outposts, claiming to have just one base anywhere in Africa: Camp Lemonnier in the tiny nation of Djibouti. They don’t like to talk about military operations. They offer detailed information about only a tiny fraction of their training exercises. They refuse to disclose the locations where personnel have been stationed or even counts of the countries involved.”

For example earlier this year in January an operation dubbed “Silent Quest 15-1” took place at the MacDill Air force base in Tampa, Florida. Pentagon forces led by the U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) in conjunction with 12 other states including Canada, Denmark, Germany, Norway and France, carried out exercises which planned for military operations against what was labelled as a war against the fictional “Islamic State of Africa.”

Turse recounts a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing where AFRICOM Commander David Rodriguez was the principal speaker, where the Pentagon presented an open-ended strategy for military interventions in Africa. The spending for such operations seem limitless since there is no real public debate surrounding these imperialist aims.

## DA

### 2NC

#### Blowback arguments are wrong and contingent on other factors – drones are net-effective in reducing terrorist strength

Johnston and Sarbahi 15 – Patrick B. Johnston, Political Scientist at RAND Corporation, former fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government and the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University, Anoop K. Sarbahi, Political Science Professor at University of Minnesota, visiting scholar in the Department of Political Science at Stanford, formerly held pre- and post-doctoral positions at Harvard University and the University of California, Los Angeles, PhD in Political Science from UCLA, MPhil degree in Development Studies from the Indian Institute of Technology, Mumbai, 2015 (“The Impact of U.S. Drone Strikes on Terrorism in Pakistan,” forthcoming *International Studies Quarterly*, April 21st, PDF, <http://patrickjohnston.info/materials/drones.pdf>)

Our findings also run counter to the implications of recent survey-based findings, which suggest that the harm inflicted by drone strikes on the civilian population has led to increased support for insurgents (Lyall, Blair and Imai 2013) or led to increased anti-Americanism (Kaltenthaler, Miller and Fair 2012). This is consistent with the radicalization mechanism underlying our hypothesis 1 discussed in Section 3.1. However, we did not find any observable evidence that supports this implication. Our findings suggest that the linkage between increased support for counterinsurgent or increased anti-Americanism, on the one hand, and terrorist attacks (or recruitment), on the other, is likely more complicated than usually hypothesized. The relationship is likely contingent on other factors such as the ability to operate without constant surveillance, likelihood of being killed (calculus of survival), presence of alternative modes of opposition, or other locally-specific factors. Sympathy for a cause or public anger at counterterrorist actions may not necessarily translate into the collective action necessary to observe an increase in active participation in militant activities that results in an escalation of terrorist attacks.

Given that drone strikes are associated with reductions in militant attacks in the areas where they occur, we also expect drone strikes to be negatively associated with the lethality, or “quality,” of militant attacks in these same areas. 35 This is indeed the case. Consistent with Hypothesis 2, the estimate presented in column 5 of Table 3 suggests that the lethality of militant attacks declined by an average of nearly 25 percentage points in a given week in which a drone strike occurred. On average, 2.77 people were killed or injured in militant attacks in FATA between 2007 and the end of the third quarter of 2011. This figure would decline substantially to 1.73 per week as a result of a single drone strike if the number of drone strikes would increase by one per agency-week. 36

**Complex network analysis demonstrates the value of low-level targeted killing – casual observation can’t penetrate organization secrecy and should be ignored.**

**McNeal 13** – (2/25, Gregory, JD, professor at Pepperdine University, former Assistant Director of the Institute for Global Security, former legal consultant to the Chief Prosecutor of the Department of Defense Office of Military Commissions, “Kill-Lists and Network Analysis,” http://www.lawfareblog.com/2013/02/kill-lists-and-network-analysis/)

NETWORK BASED ANALYSIS AND PATTERN OF LIFE SURVEILLANCE

To outside observers, some targets such as senior operational leaders are obviously worthy of placement on a kill-list, while the propriety of adding other persons to a kill-list may be more hotly disputed. While it may be clear that killing a bomb-maker (to draw from the example in my last post) is an obvious choice as it can create a gap in an enemy organization that may be hard to fill, removing other individuals (even if they are quickly replaced) may similarly pressure or disrupt terrorist organizations. As CIA director Hayden stated in 2009:

By making a safe haven feel less safe, we keep al-Qaeda guessing. We make them doubt their allies; question their methods, their plans, even their priorities… we force them to spend more time and resources on self-preservation, and that distracts them, at least partially and at least for a time, from laying the groundwork for the next attack.

When personnel within the targeting process are developing names for kill-lists, they will look beyond the criticality and vulnerability factors (described in my prior post) and will supplement that analysis with network based analysis. Networked based analysis looks at terrorist groups as nodes connected by links, and assesses how components of that terrorist network operate together and independently of one another. Those nodes and links, once identified will be targeted with the goal of disrupting and degrading their functionality. To effectively pursue a network based approach, bureaucrats rely in part on what is known as “pattern of life analysis” which involves connecting the relationships between places and people by tracking their patterns of life. This analysis draws on the interrelationships among groups “to determine the degree and points of their interdependence.” It assesses how activities are linked and looks to “determine the most effective way to influence or affect the enemy system.”

While the enemy moves from point to point, reconnaissance or surveillance tracks and notes every location and person visited. Connections between the target, the sites they visit, and the persons they interact with are documented, built into a network diagram and further analyzed. Through this process links and nodes in the enemy’s network emerge. The analysis charts the “social, economic and political networks that underpin and support clandestine networks” identifying key-decision makers and those who support or influence them indirectly. This may mean that analysts will track logistics and money trails, they may identify key facilitators and non-leadership persons of interests and they will exploit human and signals intelligence. They will feed this information into computer systems that help integrate the knowledge and which generate and cross-references thousands of data points to construct a comprehensive picture of the enemy network. “This analysis has the effect of taking a shadowy foe and revealing his physical infrastructure…as a result, the network becomes more visible and vulnerable, thus negating the enemy’s asymmetric advantage of denying a target.”

NETWORK BASED ANALYSIS AND THE KILLING OF “FOOT SOLDIERS”

Viewing targeting in this way demonstrates how **seemingly low level individuals such as couriers and other “middle-men” in decentralized networks such as al Qaeda are oftentimes critical to the successful functioning of the enemy organization**. Targeting these individuals can “destabilize clandestine networks by compromising large sections of the organization, distancing operatives from direct guidance, and impeding organizational communication and function.” Moreover, because clandestine networks rely on social relationships to manage the trade-off between maintaining secrecy and security, attacking key nodes can have a detrimental impact on the enemy’s ability to conduct their operations. Thus, while some individuals may seem insignificant to the outside observer, when considered by an analyst relying on network based analytical techniques, the elimination of a seemingly low level individual might have an important impact on an enemy organization. Moreover, because terrorist networks rely on secrecy in communication, individuals within those networks may forge strong ties that remain dormant for the purposes of operational security. This means that social ties that appear inactive or weak to a casual observer such as an NGO, human rights worker, journalist, or even a target’s family members may in fact be **strong ties within the network**. Furthermore, because terrorist networks oftentimes rely on social connections between charismatic leaders to function, disrupting those lines of communication can significantly impact those networks.

For example, Osama Bin Laden’s courier Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti was Bin Laden’s sole means of communicating with the rest of al Qaeda. To preserve operational security, he is rumored to have kept his relationship with Bin Laden a secret from some of his family members in the Persian Gulf. Once identified, tracking al-Kuwaiti allowed analysts to determine the links and nodes in Bin Laden’s network. Moreover, if the government had chosen to kill al-Kuwaiti, a mere courier, it would have prevented Bin Laden from leading his organization (desynchronizing the network) until Bin Laden could find a trustworthy replacement. Finding such a replacement would be a difficult task considering that al Kuwaiti lived with Bin Laden, and was his trusted courier for years. Of course, sometimes intelligence gained from continuing to monitor a target is more significant than killing or capturing the target (as was initially the case with al Kuwaiti). This is a point that is recognized by **every expert in targeting**. Critics oftentimes accuse the government of not considering the potential intelligence loss associated with killing rather than capturing persons, but that intelligence loss is one that is well known by targeteers. The only issue is that someone deep within the killing process has decided that an operation, when it occurs, is worth the intelligence loss (given the available options).

**Actually causes backlash against AQ and the Taliban – frees up population to fight back**

**Llenza 11** – (2011, Michael, Diplomacy Department, Norwich University, US Navy fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security, “Targeted Killings in Pakistan: A Defense,” Global Security Studies, Spring, 2011, Volume 2, Issue 2)

In the end, what matters to the policy makers is whether the targeted killings are an effective means of counter-terrorism. The nature of transnational terrorist groups means that large-scale military operations will not be particularly effective against them (Anderson, 2009, p.7). They are few in number, dispersed across several borders and more efficiently targeted through narrower means (ibid.). Although overt warfare is most useful in eliminating a regime that harbors terrorist groups, it is not an effective means of going after the terrorists themselves (ibid.).

A former CIA officer compared the Predator strikes to attacking a beehive one bee at a time, “you can kill some very important bees, but the hive is going to remain (Raddatz, p.42).” **What counter-terrorism specialists are counting on though is that such strikes will eliminate not just the queen bees, but also their most valuable workers**, **those with the knowledge that takes years to acquire**, such as some of the bomb makers and paramilitary specialists who have been killed. While a long list of charismatic leaders willing to take the fight to the U.S. will probably remain, **those who possess the knowledge to actually inflict damage as well as pass on to others the training required to do so, will dwindle**. There is therefore good reason to believe that targeted killings will weaken and demoralize organizations that already suffer from no clear institutional structure (Statman). **Killing such individuals should in the end make it more difficult for the terror machinery to function** (ibid.).

Taliban spokesperson Tariq Azam has stated that their meetings within the FATA no longer take place in direct view of the skies and that they have been forced underground (Khan & Arnoldy). **Citizens of the tribal regions have begun to form armed posses and have torched the homes of Taliban members** and their supporters **as well as destroyed training camps** (ibid.). Still drone strikes are a counter-terrorism option, not a counter insurgency strategy. Drone attacks have empowered the people of the region to act against the Taliban but failure on behalf of the government to stabilize the regions will only result in their return (ibid.)

**Can’t replace lost talent – means no impact**

**Anderson 13** – (5/24, Kenneth, Professor of Law, Washington College of Law, American University Member, Task Force on National Security and Law, The Hoover Institution, Stanford University, “The Case for Drones,” Real Clear Politics)

Other critics argue that drone warfare is ineffective because killing one operational commander merely means that another rises to take his place. This is the source of the oft-heard remark that drone warfare is a “whack-a-mole” strategy: Kill one here and another pops up there. Drone warfare is nothing more than a tactic masquerading as a strategy, it is said. Worse, it indulges one of the oldest and most seductive quests of modern military technology, the one that says you can win a war from the air alone.

**The whack-a-mole criticism is wildly overstated and, as a matter of terrorist leadership, simply not true**. Captured terrorist communications show that qualified and experienced operational commanders are not so easy to come by. One can argue that the failure to carry off large-scale attacks in the West is the result of the defensive hardening of targets and better homeland security, which is certainly true; but **culling the ranks of terrorist leaders and the resulting inability to plan another 9/11** is also critical.